and

Pr(¬e∧¬H 1 ) 5 Pr(¬e∧¬H 2 ).
Such judgments violate formality inasmuch as they imply that some variable beyond those encompassed by Definition 2 influences A's judgment of confirmation. The additional variable may or may not have a probabilistic character (see the Discussion section), but it must involve more than the kind of point estimates seen in Table 1 .
It is worth emphasizing that Hypothesis 3 is not connected to issues of human rationality. At least, there seems to be no evident defect in estimates of confirmation that depend on more than the probabilities listed in Definition 2. In contrast, normative concern is justified if people sometimes confuse confirmation with conditional probability-as suggested, for example, in Sides et al. (2002) . Such confusion can lead to probabilistic incoherence-specifically, to conjunction fallacies. 3 But none of this is relevant to the present context, where coherence is assumed (and enforced by our experimental procedure).
The assumption that epistemic agents are formal has produced many philosophical insights. 4 Here we investigate the empirical question of whether human reasoners satisfy the same assumption-that is, we test Hypothesis 3. For this purpose, we constructed pairs e, H of statements with distinct content that engender the same estimates of probability. Formality requires that judgments of confirmation coincide across content.
ExpErimEnT 1
Thirty-two students (17 female) from the University of Trento participated in exchange for course credit (mean age 23) . In what follows, we use A to denote a given participant in the study. A was asked to issue judgments of confirmation and probability about two scenarios, here called rich and lean, respectively.
rich Scenario
The rich scenario involved the extraction of individuals from a random sample consisting of 100 Italian women and 100 Italian men. Each drawn individual X was qualified by exactly one of the predicates e r shown in Table 2 (the "r" denotes rich). A was asked how much the information that X satisfies e r influenced her opinion that X is male. Each such question was based on a single proposition-namely, that X satisfies e r ; there was no accumulation of evidence across multiple propositions. Twelve independent extractions were imagined, one for each of the 12 predicates, presented in individually randomized order. The predicates were constructed on the basis of a pilot study to be roughly balanced between weakening and strengthening the hypothesis that X is male.
Here is more detail about how the judgments were elicited. For each draw X, A first concurred that 1/2 was the prior probability of the hypothesis that X is male (by "prior" is meant prior to presenting the predicate, which served as evidence). After the evidence was given, A chose one of the following three descriptions of its impact. . . . does not like beer Note-A pilot study suggested that predicates in the left column would tend to confirm the hypothesis that the drawn individual is male, whereas predicates in the right column would be disconfirmatory to a similar extent. The pilot study also suggested that predicates higher in the left-hand list would be more confirmatory of the hypothesis, and that predicates higher in the right-hand list would be more disconfirmatory. All predicates are translated from Italian. (Eells, 1982; Jeffrey, 1992) Keynes, 1921; Horwich, 1982) n(e, H) 5 Pr(e | H) 2 Pr(e | ¬H) (Nozick, 1981) (Crupi et al., in press) otherwise Note-Each maps an evidence statement e and hypothesis H into a real number intended to measure the confirmation that e provides for H. We rely on Eells and Fitelson (2002) for some literature citations. Measure l is the log of the "Bayes factor" (Jeffrey, 2004) , which may have been originally introduced by Alan Turing (according to Good, 1984 • the number of men in the sample of 100 to which e r applies, 5 and
• the number of women in the sample of 100 to which e r applies.
For ease of notation, we abbreviate the statement that X satisfies predicate e r to just e r . Letting H r be the (rich scenario) hypothesis that X is male, the estimates elicited in the rich scenario determine (5 
Lean Scenario
The lean scenario consisted of urn problems whose parameters were based on the probabilities (5) recorded in the rich scenario. For each predicate e r of the rich scenario, A was asked to consider an urn with 200 balls composed as follows.
• 100 3 Pr(e r ∧H r ) red striped balls • 100 3 Pr(¬e r ∧H r ) red spotted balls • 100 3 Pr(e r ∧¬H r ) blue striped balls • 100 3 Pr(¬e r ∧¬H r ) blue spotted balls Because Pr(e r ∧H r ) 1 Pr(¬e r ∧H r ) 5 Pr(e r ∧¬H r ) 1 Pr(¬e r ∧ ¬H r ) 5 1/2, the urn contains 100 red balls and 100 blue balls, corresponding to the men and women in the rich scenario. The proportion of red balls that are striped corresponds to A's estimate of the number of men satisfying the predicate e r , and likewise the proportion of striped blue balls corresponds to A's estimate of the number of women satisfying e r . Note that these proportions were tailored to the individual participant A, relying on just A's responses in the rich scenario (there was no averaging).
These numbers were communicated to A via a pie chart, with four regions labeled by the appropriate kind of ball and sized to reflect their respective fraction of the total. It was explicitly stated that the urn contained 200 balls evenly divided between red and blue. The subdivision of red and blue into striped and spotted was reflected solely by relative size of their pie slices. (Dots were regularly spaced along the circumference of the chart but no numbers were displayed.)
Relative to this urn, A was presented with the hypothesis H l that a drawn ball is red and concurred that the prior probability of H l is 1/2. Then, A was asked to estimate the impact on H l of learning that the drawn ball is striped. The latter fact serves as evidence e l in the lean scenario. The same options (Answers 4A-4C) were employed to elicit judgments, followed by the same scale as before. The pie chart remained on the screen until the estimate of impact was collected. As a manipulation check, participants were subsequently asked to estimate the proportions of each type of ball in the urns of the lean scenario (with pie charts present). For each urn, these estimates determine Pr(e l ∧H l ), Pr(e l ∧ ¬H l ), Pr(¬e l ∧H l ), and Pr(¬e l ∧¬H l ).
Participants in the experiment were run individually. The design required that lean scenario probabilities match the corresponding rich scenario probabilities. Participants thus confronted the 12 rich scenarios prior to the lean. Within each scenario, judgments about evidential impact were always elicited before probability estimates. In both scenarios (rich and lean), confirmation judgments were preceded by practice problems. All questions were posed through a computer interface that composed the urns and pie charts of the lean scenario on the basis of answers recorded in the rich scenario. There was ample opportunity to revisit each answer before proceeding.
Overall, the 32 participants estimated the following quantities for each of 12 corresponding evidence pairs e r , e l . (6) Such judgments are unintelligible since they imply that evidence e may confirm (disconfirm) hypothesis H despite decreasing (increasing) its initial credibility. 7 The 15 excluded data sets represent less than 2% of the total. There remain 369 matched pairs of data sets-that is, involving corresponding e r , e l from which neither (6A) nor (6B) was excluded. Subsequent analyses employ just these matched pairs. Let us first determine whether, as intended, (7 A total of 94% of the differences were zero (as intended by the design of the experiment). The mean absolute difference for the remaining pairs was only .009, which presumably resulted from the lack of explicit numerical information in the pie charts of the lean scenario. There were 12 average differences between estimates of Pr(e r ∧H r ) versus Pr(e l ∧H l ), and 12 between estimates of Pr(e r ∧¬H r ) versus Pr(e l ∧¬H l ), for matched e r , e l . None of these were revealed to be reliable at p , .05 by either paired t test or Wilcoxon signed-rank test for related measures. Thus, almost exactly, the urns in the lean scenario satisfied (7) . In conjunction with the acknowledgment by all participants that Pr(H r ) 5 Pr(H l ) 5 1/2, this allows formality to be tested by comparing judgments of confirmation between the rich and lean scenarios. The median values of CONF(e r , H r ) and CONF(e l , H l ) are shown in Table 4 . In 11 of the 12 matched pairs, the difference in confirmation was significant by Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p , .05). Thus, a given piece of evidence has distinct impact on the respective hypotheses of the rich and lean scenarios, despite the equality of relevant probabilities.
On the other hand, the median lean confirmation values appear to be a dilation of the rich, and the two are significantly correlated (Kendall's τ-b 5 .79, N 5 12, p , .01). The median correlation (N 5 32) between confirmations from the same participant in the two scenarios is .74 (again using Kendall's τ-b; some of these correlations are of length 10 or 11 because of the 15 excluded data sets).
Because probabilities could be controlled only in the lean scenario (via urns), lean estimates always came after rich estimates. Before drawing conclusions from Experiment 1, we must therefore consider the possibility that the greater dispersion seen for estimates of confirmation in the lean scenario is due to its position in the procedure. Experiment 2 controlled for this potential confound.
ExpErimEnT 2 (ConTroL)
Thirty-two students-the same number as in Experiment 1-participated in Experiment 2, who were again recruited from the University of Trento in exchange for course credit (27 female, mean age 21). None had participated in Experiment 1. The students were asked to issue judgments of confirmation and probability about urns in the lean scenario; no material from the rich scenario was presented. Specifically, each participant B in Experiment 2 was paired with a unique participant A in Experiment 1. The 12 urns constructed for A (on the basis of A's responses to the rich scenario) served as stimuli for B. The procedure was identical to the lean part of Experiment 1 (in particular, urns were presented to B in the same order as for A).
results
In the present experiment, let H c be the hypothesis that a drawn ball is red, and let e c be the evidence that the drawn ball is striped ("c" signifies "control"). Corresponding to each of the 12 rich predicates from Experiment 1, a given participant in Experiment 2 evaluated the following data set (which corresponds to [6B] in Experiment 1).
For the hypothesis H c 5 "the selected ball is red," In contrast, recall that 15 data sets were withdrawn from Experiment 1 because of such anomalies. To ensure comparability between the two experiments, the corresponding 15 data sets were withdrawn from the data of Experiment 2. For each of the 12 rich scenarios from Experiment 1, we compared the mean estimates for Pr(e c ∧H c ) of Experiment 2 with the mean for Pr(e l ∧H l ) from the lean scenario of Experiment 1. Likewise, we compared Pr(e c ∧¬H c ) with Pr(e l ∧¬H l ). The two sets of numbers were nearly identical, with no reliable difference in any of the 12 comparisons (via t test). The same was true of the respective medians (MannWhitney U test). The congruence of estimates between the two experiments is not surprising, since they were based on pie charts for the same urns. Similarly, there were no significant differences for any predicate between Pr(e c ∧H c ) and Pr(e r ∧H r ) or between Pr(e c ∧¬H c ) and Pr(e r ∧¬H r ). More important are the confirmation estimates. The second column of Table 5 shows for each scenario the median estimate provided by participants in Experiment 2. (The same information for Experiment 1 appears in Table 4 .) For a given predicate, the medians of CONF(e c , H c ) versus CONF(e l , H l ) and CONF(e c , H c ) versus CONF(e r , H r ) were compared via Mann-Whitney U test. The z scores for these comparisons are also shown in Table 5 . It may be seen that across the 12 predicates, none of the comparisons between CONF(e c , H c ) and CONF(e l , H l ) reach significance. By contrast, 10 of the 12 comparisons between CONF(e c , H c ) and CONF(e r , H r ) are significant [as compared with 11 for CONF(e l , H l ) versus CONF(e r , H r )]. In other words, the impact of evidence in the lean scenario was nearly identical when assessed by itself versus after the rich scenario, and different in both cases from the corresponding impact in the rich scenario.
We conclude that the disparity between confirmation judgments in the rich versus lean scenarios in Experiment 1 did not derive from the lean scenario coming after the rich. Qualitatively similar estimates were seen in the lean judgments of Experiment 2, which were not accompanied by any rich estimates.
DiSCuSSion
The results summarized in Table 4 suggest that human reasoners are not formal in the sense of Definition 2, for judgments of confirmation depend on more than probabilities over e and H. The missing argument may be the probability of some other event, but we suspect that it has a different character altogether.
Notice that in comparison with the sharp chances defined by urns, probabilities in the rich scenario seem more affected by personal ignorance than by objective uncertainty alone. These variables are known to influence willingness to bet (Ellsberg, 1961; Heath & Tversky, 1991) . They may also lead our reasoner A to lower confidence for her distribution in the rich scenario in comparison with the lean, even though she reports the same distribution in the two cases. 8 Furthermore, suppose that A assesses confirmation consistently with her reported probabilities (via some metric in Table 1 ) but adjusts the outcome through multiplication with the relevant confidence level (rich vs. lean). Confirmation (either positive or negative) would then be multiplied by greater confidence in the lean scenario. It is easy to see that such a response strategy would explain the dilation phenomenon noted earlier (namely, that estimates of confirmation are more extreme in the lean scenario than in the rich; see Table 4 ). Variants of this hypothesis (still consistent with dilation) are easy to construct; for example, it suffices to multiply confirmation by any strictly increasing function of confidence. If human judges behave in such a manner, then some confirmation metric definable from just Pr(e∧H), Pr(e∧¬H) , Pr(¬e∧H) , and Pr(¬e∧¬H) may underlie estimates of evidential impact, but the metric would not be deployed mentally in the simple way suggested by Table 1 .
Of course, it is also possible that confirmation judgment does not involve confidence in distributions, and that dilation must be explained as some other kind of content effect. Perhaps the ambiguous probabilities evoked by the rich scenario lead judges to hesitate about the interpretation of evidence, resulting in more conservative estimates of impact without the adjustments envisioned above. Indeed, content has been shown to intervene in many settings, including interpreting logical connectives (Newstead, Griggs, & Chrostowski, 1984; Ray, Reynolds, & Carranza, 1989) , testing conditional rules (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Kirby, 1994) , estimating probabilities (Mellers, Hertwig, & Kahneman, 2001; Sloman, Over, Slovak, & Stibel, 2003) , and forming preferences among options (Goldstein & Weber, 1995) .
Finally, observe that our experimental procedure was framed in terms of strengthening or weakening belief (see Answers 4A-4C, above). It is not guaranteed that the same pattern of results would be obtained under different wording-notably, in terms of evidential impact, support, or change in probability. 9 Divergent results with alternative wording would signal multiple forms of reasoning about evidence. Convergent results would reinforce the conviction that confirmation is a fundamental variable in human judgment.
